独立行政法人
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Content
Ⅰ. Formation of seismic design code in Japan
Ⅱ. Outline of Japan Nuclear Safety Committee’s
Seismic Design Review Guide;
comparing Before and Revised
Ⅲ. Comparison the point of seismic design practice
between Japan and USA
Ⅳ.Conclusion
1
独立行政法人
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Ⅰ.Formation of seismic design code in Japan
Nuclear Safety Commission
・Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear
Power Reactor Facilities (15pages)
→ 1981July Established
2006 Sept. Revised
METI (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency)
・Ministry Code No62 “Technical code for Nuclear
Power Reactor Facilities Article5 Seismic requirement”
(1 page)
Technical
support
JNES
Endorse
Japan Electric Association (Utilities)
・Technical Guidelines for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants
JEAG4601 (~1300pages) →1970,1984,1987,1991 Completed gradually
(English version: NUREG/CR-6241)
Now revising
2
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Formation of seismic design code in Japan
NSC Seismic design Reviewing Guide
(Revised)
1.Introduction
2.Scope
3.Basic Policy
4.Classification of Importance in Seismic Design
5.Determination of design basis earthquake
ground motion
JEA JEAG4601 (Now under revising)
1.Basic items
Purpose, Scope, Basic policy
2.Classification of Importance in Seismic Design
Classification, seismic force for each class
3.Earthquake and basic earthquake ground motion
for seismic design
Earthquake ground motion, Tsunami evaluation
4.Geological and ground survey
6.Principle of seismic design
Policy, Seismic force for each class
7.Load combinations and allowable limits
8.Consideration of the accompanying events of
earthquake
Tsunami, Collapse of inclined plane
NSC Introduction to Safety
Examination of Geology/Soil of NPP
( Not revised)
5.Safety evaluation of ground and seismic design of
civil structures
R/B base, around inclined plane, outside civil
structures
6.Seismic design of building structures
Material, load combinations and allowable limits,
structural design, response analysis, seismic
margin
7. Seismic design of equipment / piping system
Load combinations and allowable limits, seismic
force, response analysis, function maintenance
evaluation, energy absorbing support
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Each task for the present ; after NSC Guide revised
NSC
・Review Seismic Re-evaluation of Existing NPPs by utilities
・Revise “Introduction to Safety Examination of Geology/Soil of NPPs”
METI (NISA)
・Review Seismic Re-evaluation of Existing NPPs by utilities
・Investigate lessons learned from the Niigatakenn-tyuuetsuoki earthquake and effect to Kashiwazaki NPP
Technical
support
JNES
・Upfill Ministry Code No62 Article5 “Seismic requirement”
Utilities (Japan Electric Association )
・ Seismic Re-evaluation of Existing NPPs according to revised NSC Guide
・ Review JEAG4601 according to lessons learned from the earthquake
and re-evaluation of NPPs
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Ⅱ. Outline of Japan Nuclear Safety Committee’s
Seismic Design Review Guide;
comparing Before and Revised
5
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◆ NSC revised Sep. 2006 their “Regulatory Guide for
reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor
Facilities” ,
to reflect seismological and seismic engineering
progress after 1995 Hyougo-ken Nanbu Earthquake.
◆ NISA promptly required utilities to re- evaluate
seismic design of all existing NPPs according to
revised guide.
◆ Utilities started re-evaluation from the step of
geological survey
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1. Main points of the revision
Item
Design Base
Earthquake
Definition
Before
・S1: Return period more than 10000y
Stay in elastic region*
・S2: Return period more than 50000y
Keep function*
* Class As、A component
Geological
Survey
Consideration of
Vertical Seismic
Force
Phenomena
accompanying
earthquake
・One DBE Ss:
Consider active fault hereafter
late Pleistocene (80000-130000y before)
Keep function*
・Sd for design (Not earthquake) to stay in
elastic region*
Sd=α×Ss ; α≧0.5
* Class S component
Use most updated knowledge and technique
Fv= 1/2 FH (Static)
Over DBE
Earthquake
Seismic
Classification
Revised
Define Fv dynamically
Possibility of over DBE earthquake cannot be
denied. Risk by over DBE is to be assessed for
reference
As, A, B, C
S (old As and A), B, C
Old A class ranked up to As
Consider the effect of;
・Tsunami,
・Collapse of around inclined plane
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1.1 DBE Definition - Earthquake Research Flow
(③)
Before
Past Earthquakes
Maximum Design Earthquake
Active Faults
Extreme Design Earthquake
Seismo-tectonic Features
Near Field Earthquake
(②)
Revised
Inter-plate Earthquakes
Shallow Inland Earthquakes
Intra-plate Earthquakes
Basic Earthquake
Ground Motion S1
Basic Earthquake
Ground Motion S2
(Horizontal component
only)
(④)
(②)
Ground motion Evaluation
Considered Earthquakes(①)
Ground motion Evaluation
Considered Earthquakes(①)
Design Earthquake
Ground Motion Sd
Site-specific Ground motion
with specified source
Basic Earthquake
Ground Motion Ss
(③)
Ground motion with non-specified source
Both Horizontal
and Vertical
(④)
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DBE Definition - Earthquake Consideration
Before
◆ Consider with each research methods
・Earthquake documents
・Active faults research
Past Earthquakes
Active Faults
・Seismicity near site
Seismo-tectonic Features
Revised
◆ Consider with each source type
a. Inter-plate Earthquakes
b. Shallow Inland Earthquakes
c. Intra-plate Earthquakes
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DBE Definition – Ground Motion Evaluation
Before
◆ Empirical methods (Response spectrum evaluation)
Point source
Revised
◆ Empirical methods + Strong motion evaluation using Earthquake source model
Evaluate the Ground motion directly
Consider the effects of the fault plane
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DBE Definition – Near-Field Earthquake
Consider Near-field Earthquake (M6.5)
by way of precaution
擬似速度応答スペクトル(cm/s)
Before
100
10
1
Revised
擬似速度応答スペクトル(cm/s)
Estimate the upper level of the ground
motion due to the earthquakes source
of which are difficult to specify in spite
of detailed survey in the vicinity of the
site,
directly on the basis of near-source
strong motion records
0.01
0.1
周期(s)
1
10
1
10
100
10
1
0.01
0.1
周期(s)
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Active Faults Consideration
Before
◆ Consider the active faults that has activity in 50,000 years
Active Fault of Low activity (Return period more than 50,000 )
→ Consider as the source of S2
Active Fault of high activity (Return period more than 10,000 )
→ Consider as the source of S1
Revised
◆ For Ss, consider the active faults that has activity in the late Pleistocene
(referring to last Interglacial strata[about 80,000 – 130,000 years before])
Consider as the source of Inland Earthquakes for Ss
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1.2 Geological Survey
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Revised
Requirement for most updated technique and more
detailed survey in the vicinity of the site
In-land
Off-shore
Seismic profiling by controlled
seismic source
Supersonic wave survey
・Over 10km beneath
the sea bottom can be
searchable now
Seismic Profiling
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1.3 Consideration of Vertical Seismic Force
Before
Consider Vertical Seismic Force as ½ as Horizontal, statically
Dynamic
Revised
Consider Both Horizontal and Vertical Seismic Force dynamically
Dynamic
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2. Seismic Classification
Before
4 classes
RPV, PCV etc.
As
As … Designed with S2
A
ECCS, RHRS etc.
B
Main Turbine System etc.
C
Other Facilities
Revised
3 classes
(Maintains Safety
Function)
also designed with S1
(Remains within Elastic limit)
A … Designed with S1
(Remains within Elastic limit)
◆ A and As classes are integrated into S class
S … Designed with Ss
(Maintains Safety
Function)
S
B
C
also designed with Sd
(Remains within Elastic limit)
Sd=α×Ss , α≧0.5
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Before
Aseismic classification and seismic force
★ Total of four classifications of A, B, C class, and still more important As class.
PRESENT
Seismic force
Basic
earthquake
ground motion S2
Example of Major facilities
Aseismic
importance
As
Basic earthquake ground
motion S1 or 3.0CI either
large
A
Seismi force of 1.5CI
(Note 5)
B
Seismi force of 1.0CI
C
BWR
PWR
・Containment Vessel
・Control Rod
・Residual Heat Removal
System
・Emergency Diesel Generator
・Reactor Pressure Vessel
etc
・Containment Vessel
・Control Rod
・Residual Heat Removal
System
・Emergency Diesel Generator
・Reactor Vessel
etc
・Emergency Corel Cooling System
etc
・Safety injecting System
・Waste Disposal System
・Turbine equipment(Note 5)
etc
・Waste Disposal System
etc
etc
・Main Generator
etc
・Main Generator
・Turbine equipment(Note 5)
etc
(Note 5)CI: Story shear coefficient to Static force required by civil code for non-nuclear structure
(Note 6 ) Although turbine equipment is classified into C class according to a functional classification, turbine equipment of BWR is B class
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Revised
Total of three classifications of S, B, and C class.
(Present As and A class were unified and it considered as S class.)
It is changed into a higher rank from the present classification.
REVISED
REVISION
Example of Major facilities
Aseismic
importance
PWR
BWR
・Containment Vessel
・Control Rod
・Residual Heat Removal
System
・Emergency Diesel Generator
・Reactor Pressure Vessel
etc
・Containment Vessel
・Control Rod
・Residual Heat Removal
System
・Emergency Diesel Generator
・Reactor Vessel
etc
・Emergency Corel Cooling System
etc
・Safety injecting System
・Waste Disposal System
・Turbine equipment(Note 5)
etc
etc
etc
・Horizontal sesmic force and
vertica seismic force
(dynamic)due to the basic
earthguake ground
motion Ss are combined both
in the unfavorate direction
・Elastic design ground motion
Sd or 3.0CI either large
etc
・Waste Disposal System
・Main Generator
S
Seismic force
・Main Generator
・Turbine equipment(Note 5)
B
same as present
C
same as present
etc
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Before
Load combination and allowable limit
★Load combination and allowable limit corresponding to four classifications
PRESENT
Allowable limit
Load combination
(1)Capability
fully
deformation (1)Basic earthquake ground
(margin of ductility) as a structure
motion S2 and normal load,
and appropriate safety margin to
etc
ultimate strength
(2)Either basic earthquake
ground motion S1 or static
(2)Allowable stress based on a
load and normal load, etc
suitable standard and standard
Basic
earthquake
ground
Allowable stress based on a
motion S1 or static load and
suitable standard and standard
normal load, etc
same as the above
static load and normal load, etc
same as the above
same as the above
(1)Even when the structure of a
portion carries out plastic (1)Basic earthquake ground
deformation fairly, excessive
motion S2 and operating
load,etc
modification, a crack, breakage,
etc. arise and the function of (2)Basic earthquake ground
motion S1 or static load and
facility is not affected.
(2)Yield stress or the allowable limit
operating load etc
of equivalent safety
Basic
earthquake
ground
Yield stress or the allowable limit of
motion S1 or static load and
equivalent safety
operating load, etc
Allowable stress based on a Static load and operating
suitable standard and standard
load ,etc
same as the above
same as the above
Aseismic
importance
Facilities
As
Building/
Structure
A
B
C
As
Equipment/
piping
A
B
C
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Revised
★Load combination and allowable limit corresponding to three classifications
REVISED
REVISION
Facilities
Aseismic
importance
Load combination
Allowable limit
S
(1)Basic earthquake
ground motion Ss
and normal load ,etc
(2) Elastic design
ground motion Sd or
static load and
normal load, etc
same as present
same as present
same as present
(1)Basic earthquake
ground motion Ss
and operating load,
etc
(2)Elastic design ground
motion Sd or static
load and operating
load ,etc
(1)Stress analysis is same as
the present .
(2) The check of active
component to basic
earthquake ground motion
Ss is based on
comparison with the
acceleration using the
actual probed
examination ,etc
same as present
same as present
Building/
Structure
B
C
S
Equipment/
piping
B
C
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3.Consideration to the phenomena accompanying earthquake
Before
★The concrete demand is not described
The demand to the natural disaster of a landslide, tsunami or
high tide, and others is specified independently.
Revised
★Followings should be taked into account in the seismic design
(1)
Influence of the safety function on the facilities by
collapse of a circumference slope
(2) Influence of the safety function on the facilities by tsunami
The maximum height of tsunami
+
The water level at the time of high water
The minimum water level of tsunami
★Height of installation of plant
★Water proof design of
facilities or equipment
etc
★Management by the design
of facilities or equipment
etc
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Ⅲ. Comparison the point of seismic design
practice
between Japan and USA
Here present Japan side
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Outlines of Japanese Practice (Based on JEAG 4601)
1. Load combinations and allowable stress limits
Probability
Operating
States
( / year )
Earthquake
( / year )
Independent Event
Combination with S1
Dependent
Event
S1 (Dependent)
(Ex.) Taking into account of
occurrence of S1 in the long term
after LOCA
1min
1hour
1day
1year
Operating states and earthquakes are combined as above, considering
probability of earthquakes and probability and duration of accidents.
22
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Allowable Stress of Piping (Type 1)
Allowable
stress state
ⅢAS
ⅣAS
Stress Class
Primary stress
(including bending stress)
Primary +
Secondary stress
Primary +
Secondary + Peak stress
3 Sm
Fatigue usage factor
<= 1.0
2.25 Sm
3 Sm
S1 (ⅢAS) , S2 (ⅣAS)
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2.1 Spectrum Modal Analysis
Design FRS
6. Dynamic Design Analysis of Components
Based on their Own Proper Periods
3. Input the DBE into the
Building, Taking into
Account of the Ground
2. Design Base Earthquake
FRS
5. Making of FRS for Reasonable
Evaluation of Components
4. Response Analysis
of the Building
1. Target Spectrum of DBE
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2.1.1 Structures
◆ Shear-Beam Modeling of
Building
Mass
Beam Model
Floor Model
○ Consolidates each mass of
each facility and building
structure to the floor Level
○ Evaluate Stiffness of
Column & Bearing-Wall
against Bending-Moment &
Shear Force
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◆ Response Analysis of Building
○ Modeling of Building
○ Input Ground-Motion from
Analysis of Soil
○ Evaluate Response of
Each Floor
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・ Stress must be below allowable stress
・ Deformation must be below allowable deformation
・ Shear strain must be below allowable strain for Ss
Maximum Load
Stress
Collapse
Linear Area
Allowable
Strain for Ss
Limit Strain
Shear Strain
27
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◆ Structures Model
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■ Mass-Stiffness Modeling
■ FEM Modeling
Beam Element(Wall)
Beam Element (Wall)
Mass
Beam Element(Floor)
Mass
質点
Mass-Stiffness Model
3-D FEM Model
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◆ Structures design result
Japan
・Occasionally, static force 3Ci *
USA
?
(for As,A Building) is dominant
* 3 times larger than civil code for
general structure
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・Structures - Wall
 The walls of NPPs’, arranged in a well-balanced manner, are
about 10 times as thick as those of general buildings.
 Reinforcement have a far large diameter than that of
general buildings, and is arranged more densely.
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・Structures - Base mat
The NPPs have strong foundation slabs 3 – 7 meters thick to
withstand a great seismic force.
about 3 – 7 m
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Response Acceleration (G)
2.1.2 Piping Systems
Dynamic Design Analysis of equipments based on their own
proper periods
Input
RPV
Own Proper Periods (s)
Allowable Stress
ex.
Allowable stress state ⅢAS : 2.25Sm
Allowable stress state ⅣAS : 3Sm
Evaluation
Response Stress
<
Allowable Stress
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◆ Design floor response spectrum, Damping Factor
Japan
USA
Design floor response spectrum:
10% Peak Broadening to absorb
model or analysis uncertainty
?
Damping Factor
JEAG4601
・piping
0.5~2.5 %
・welded structure 1.0
・bolt, rivet fixture
2.0
・ PCCV
3.0
・reinforced concrete 5.0
RG1.61
・variable according to
stress level
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2.2 Time Historical Analysis for major facilities
PCV
RPV
Stabilizer Stabilizer
Shroud
Separator
Thermal Wall
 Earthquake responses of some
components around reactor are
evaluated as a coupled system
with the building and the ground.
Fuel Assembly
CRD Guide Tube
CRD Housing
Diaphragm Floor
Acceleration (Gal)
Reactor Building
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)
Input DBE wave
Time (s)
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◆ Piping and component support design
Japan
・Support for hot piping and
component;
USA
・ Mechanical snubber or
Oil snubber usually
adopted
Sticking problem
resolved?
・ Energy absorbing support
like Lead Damper will be
adopted for APWR
( Code prepared and
verification test finished)
35
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3. Technical Expertise for Seismic Response of Facilities
3.1 Achievement of Tadotsu-Shaking Table
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2003
2006
Phase I (Proving Test of component)
PCVs (PWR,BWR), RPVs (PWR,BWR), Core Internals (PWR,BWR),
Primary Recirculation Loop (BWR), Primary Coolant Loop (PWR)
Phase II (Proving Test of System Facilities)
Emergency Diesel Generator System,
Computer System, Reactor Shutdown Cooling System
Phase III (New Design and Fragility)
Main Steam & Feed Water piping with EBS,
RCCV, PCCV, Steam Generator with EBS
Seismic Tests for Regulation
Fragility Test Series
NUPEC
JNES
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3.2 Example1 Concrete Containment Vessel
Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel (RCCV)
scale : 1/10
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◆ Results (RCCV)
increasing input motion gradually
(from 2×S2)
Results:
○RCCV was safe up to 5×S2.
○RCCV collapsed by shear force
Simulation
Design
Tests
at 9×S2.
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2.2 Example 2
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Seismic Fragility Tests
A:Horizontal Shaft Pump
B:Electrical Panel
C:Control Rod Insertion of PWR
D:Control Rod Insertion of BWR
E:Large Vertical Shaft Pump
A: E: PERFORMANCE FOR ROTATION
B:ELECTRICAL FUNCTION
C: D: C.R. INSERTION
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◆ Data Example: Fragility of Electric Panels
TEST PANELS
Main Control Panel
EVALUATION METHOD
EXPERIMENT
CRITICAL ACCELARATION
INPUT ACCELARATION
CRITICAL PARTS
TEST RESULTS
2
(x9.8m/s )
(x9.8m/s2)
5.6 (S-S)
display system
6 (S-S, F-B)
No Malfunction
Reactor Auxiliary Control
Panel
Logic Unit Panel
9.8 (F-B)
module switch
6 (S-S, F-B)
No Malfunction
6.7 (S-S)
power unit
6 (S-S, F-B)
No Malfunction
Signal Processing Panel
4.4 (S-S)
AC controller card
4.3 (S-S)
Error of AC
controller card
Instrumentation Rack
4.2 (S-S)
differential
pressure
transmitter
6 (S-S, F-B)
No Malfunction
Motor Control Center
4.5 (F-B)
auxiliary relay
6 (F-B)
Power Center
4.4 (F-B)
air circuit breaker
5.0 (F-B)
Metal-Clad Switchgear
4.2 (S-S)
vacuum circuit
breaker
4.7 (F-B)
DIFFERENT TYPE PANELS
Error of magnetic
contactor caused
by auxiliary relay
chatter
Damage of air
circuit breaker
Damage of
vacuum circuit
breaker
CRITICAL ACCELARATION
CRITICAL PARTS
(x9.8m/s2)
Logic Unit Panel
6.2 (S-S)
Motor Control Center
7.1 (F-B)
Power Center
4.3 (F-B)
Metal-Clad Switchgear
4.0 (S-S)
auxiliary relay
molded case circuit
breaker
protection relay
vacuum circuit
breaker
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40
Comparison the point of seismic design practice
between Japan and USA
Hoping USA side will be presented in near future
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41
Ⅳ. Conclusion
・Research on Niigataken Tyustsu-Oki Earthquake July 2007is now ongoing
・This colloquium seems to be good occasion to present followings
sequentially
1. Research output on the earthquake and influence to
Kashiwazaki NPP
2. Lessons learned
3. Re- evaluation result of existing NPPs
4.How item 2 and 3 treated in Japanese seismic design code
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